Somebody's Gotta Post It: The TAM Crash in Sao Paulo

[aerobat]

The best ongoing discussion, as well as the best breaking news, is here:

http://www.airdisaster.com/forums/showthread.php?t=85276&page=1&pp=25

I am putting this in Captain Hutch's forum so that it doesn't flip out the "regulars" in the General Discussion forum. The airdisaster.com discussions can be quite graphic, with photos aplenty, so please proceed cautiously if you want to know more about this accident.

Fearful fliers are drawn to media reports of air disasters like moths to a candle flame. :eek: So are the "regulars" at airdisaster.com, and they have plenty of experts among them--airline pilots, controllers, and investigators, as well as amateur aviation buffs and average air travelers (and fearful fliers, too). There are several Brazilians in the thread, and it will be active for days. There is a full spectrum of speculation here, including both likely and unlikely scenarios, and also jabs and unkind remarks among the posters (their restraint ;) over there is somewhat more lax than ours).

It's too early to know the cause; speculation ranges from the absence of runway grooves to brake failure to a too-late decision to go around, and more. What we do know is that it was raining lightly, that the runway is about 6300' long, that the pilots (according to ATC and witnesses) touched down prior to the thousand-foot marker at normal approach speed, and then they failed to slow down. We have heard that the A320 may have attempted a go-around at the last minute. We know it hopped over a major road and hit a TAM Express hangar. At least 15 of the casualties were TAM employees in the hangar. There were no survivors among the passengers.:(

Hopefully Hutch will stop by and offer some perspective and reassurance.

[Captain Hutch]

I am sorry to hear about this crash. And I am sorry for the families that are touched by it.

As far as the actual issues that were involved in the crash, I think I will give it some time until the facts are out, since I believe that it is senseless to speculate. I know that the media can serve a useful purpose at times, but when the media speculates as it is wont to do when there is a void in information, the speculation only fuels fear where there should be none.

Let us wait a while! :coffee:

Captain Hutch

[Falcon]

Discusions at work based on what we have seen but we are waiting patiently for the reports. Like to meet the people who thought storing large quantities of petrol at the end of a runway was a good idea.

[aerobat]

http://www.avweb.com/eletter/archives/avflash/912-full.html#195685

[aerobat]

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/07/25/215718/airbus-cleared-to-release-tam-accident-flight-recorder.html

Airbus cleared to release TAM accident flight recorder
http://127.0.0.1:1042/bug.cgi (http://adserver.adtech.de/adlink%7C3.0%7C289%7C1061237%7C0%7C277%7CADTECH;lo c=300;key=key1+key2+key3+key4;grp=%5Bgroup%5D)

Downloading information from the TAM (http://www.tam.com.br/b2c/jsp/default.jhtml?adPagina=162&adArtigo=2798) Airbus A320 (http://www.airbus.com/en/aircraftfamilies/a320/) flight recorders began successfully on 20 July, three days after the aircraft fatally overran the runway end at São Paulo's downtown Congonhas airport, Airbus reveals in an accident information telex to operators.
The manufacturer reports that it has been cleared by the Brazilian authorities to release advice about essential considerations for landing an A320 with one thrust reverser intentionally rendered inoperative because of a fault.
The main advice, addressed to A320 pilots, reads: "During the flare at thrust reduction, select all thrust levers to IDLE."
This action is so fundamental to landing any aeroplane, it has led the professional pilot community to discuss whether the pilot handling the aircraft that night might have failed to retard the right power lever to idle (http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=284415&page=22) to avoid deploying the deactivated thrust reverser on that engine.


The video recording of the landing (http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2007/07/19/215591/video-tam-a320-speeding-on-runway-as-it-lands-in-sao-paulo.html), in which surface spray is seen being kicked up under the left wing, has been interpreted by pilots who have watched it as an indication that the crew were using the left thrust reverser only, which is permitted.
The standard procedure for using thrust reverse when one of the reversers has been disabled, according to the A320 flightcrew operating manual, is to operate both the reverser levers.
The other information Airbus has provided gives the pilots the flightcrew operating manual references denoting where to find the considerations for operating A300, A310, A320, A330 and A340 series aircraft with a thrust reverser intentionally rendered inoperable.
TAM's own A320 manual says the only airport at which both thrust reversers must be fully operating is Rio de Janeiro's downtown Santos Dumont airport, which has a shorter runway than Congonhas.
Airbus explains: "The two accident recorders [cockpit voice recorder and digital flight data recorder have been retrieved and are providing good quality data.
The DFDR decoding started on 20 July, the CVR decoding started on 23 July, both in US National Transportation Safety Board facilities under the responsibility of the Brazilian investigation authorities with the participation of the other involved investigation authorities and parties.
It is confirmed that the aircraft was dispatched with the reverser of Engine 2 inhibited according to MEL [minimum equipment list]."
The advice continues: "Based from the preliminary analysis of the DFDR, and in agreement with the Brazilian investigation authorities, Airbus reminds all operators to strictly comply with the following procedures: During the flare at thrust reduction select ALL thrust levers to IDLE."

[aerobat]

Throttle lever...

http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/N01319038.htm

[Captain Hutch]

For those of you interested in the Airbus 320 accident, I recently received some info on that. The problem was indeed related to procedures for operation of the thrust levers when there is an MEL associated with the thrust reversers.

To give a little background, in a normal landing and in a B737 (most models that I know of) the throttles are retarded to idle as the pilot flares the airplane just prior to touchdown. In the 737 there is each an additional lever just forward of the thrust lever that the pilot reaches and pulls backward to apply reverse thrust on each engine to further slow the aircraft. Using the thrust reversers saves on using the brakes and shortens the landing roll. On the B737 and the smaller Airbuses (A318, A319, A320 and A321) an MEL allows the aircraft to be flown with one of the thrust reversers inoperative. I have flown the B737 on occasion where this was the case--one of the thrust reversers, either the #1 or #2 engine will be inop and in fact the thrust reverser will be wired down so that the pilot cannot physically pull the lever back into position. Using reverse thrust from one engine instead of two is fine and not that much different from having both engines.

In the normal course of landing the thrust levers (not the thrust REVERSERS) are pulled back to idle. This is a natural action of landing an airplane. In fact, during any flight the throttles are moved according to the thrust that you need for whatever you are doing, taking off, climbing, cruising, descending, and landing, just like the accelerator on your vehicle. However the Airbus (at least in the models mentioned above) has an automated thrust system whereby placing a throttle in particular detent, such as "Climb", allows the computerized system to determine the proper thrust for that operation. There is a detent for "Idle" and "Max Reverse" also. Without going into much more detail about a system with which I am unfamiliar, for some reason the pilot did not put the thrust lever into the idle detent on landing but instead left it in the "Climb" detent, and when the autothrust system disconnected on landing (as it was supposed to do when it detected an abnormal thrust condition because reverse thrust was used on one engine), the system reverted back to the thrust called for by the position of the thrust lever, which was "Climb". So therefore, one engine was producing climb thrust while the other was in reverse.

The MEL procedure has been modified to ensure that the pilot moves both thrust levers to the full reverse position on landing, even though only one engine will be producing reverse.

My personal opinion has remained the same in that some automatic features are fine, but I can easily disconnect the system and fly the plane manually and naturally, such that my instinctive movements result in appropriate results from the aircraft. I know pilots that fly each aircraft, and each swears by his own.

Hutch :tiphat: